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STRESS IN THE WORKPLACE: JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS AND
LEGISLATIVE AND BUSINESS RESPONSES
by
Anthony Libertella *
and
George Barbero**

The purpose of this article is to explore the judicial developments and
the legislative and business responses as they relate to the increasing number of
employees seeking compensation for job-related stress illnesses. This article first
examines workers' compensation claims where mental or psychic stress causes a mental
or psychological disability. Selected cases, including the most recent holdings, are
reviewed to demonstrate the criteria laid down by various state courts in denying or
permitting recovery for such claims. Next, consideration is given to situations where
employees have gone outside of the workers' compensation field to pursue their jobstress claims either under human rights legislation or common law tort. The article
then describes the responses of various state legislative bodies and the business
community to the flood of work-related stress claims. Lastly, the newly emerging
trends in job-related stress illnesses and claims will be discussed, with a brief
necessity of a careful balancing of the interest by employers,
commentary on
employees and soctety at large in resolving this emerging crisis in the workplace.

Introduction

In 1989 stress related workers' compensation cases accounted for 15% of all
occupational disease claims. (I) Although most stress claims are currently litigated
within the workers' compensation system, with average payments of $15,000, the
dollar amount and volume of claims is projected to increase dramatically. (2) Stress
currently ranks as one of the top ten work-related problems. (3> The Northwestern
National Life Insurance Company study of 1991 indicates that the incidence of stress
claims has doubled in the past ten years, <4> and the number of employees experiencing
stress also has doubled during the same time period. <5> Currently seven out of ten
employees surveyed claim to experience work-related stress symptoms. <6>
The factors most commonly cited by employees as causing stress-related
illnesses are: reduction of employee benefits, lack of personal control over one's job,
mergers and acquisitions or change in business ownership resulting in
major departmental reorganizations causing job changes and frequent overtime. (T) It
appears that the corporate culture fosters unhealthy and too stressful enviro?ments, with
unrealistic demands frequently burdening the employees. Of the populatiOn surveyed
the Northwestern study found that 34% of employees expect to burnout on the job and
72% of all workers experience three or more stress related illnesses on a frequent
basis. <B> If the number of stress-related illnesses continues to expand as projected by
this study, stress claims are anticipated to lead all other workers' compensation claims
in the 1990's.

* Associate Professor of Studies on Corporate Values, Hagan School of Business,
Iona College, New Rochelle, New York
** Professor of Business Law, Hagan School of Business, Iona College, New
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Workers' Compensation Stress Claims

Under the great majority of workers' compensation statutes it is not any
workplace injury that entitles an employee to compensation benefits, but only those that
are determined to be accidental. <9> Most statutes define "injury" and "personal injury"
to mean "only accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of employment." 0°>
Prior to recent statutory amendments in some states, the statutes typically did not
specify any particular injury nor was any reference made to stress claims. From a
historical point of view, whether a so-called stress or mental injury claim was
compensable, depended upon case law within each state.
Workers' compensation claims involving mental stress are often classified as
follows: mental-physical claims in which mental stress causes physical disability
(anxiety induced coronary attack), physical-mental claims in which physical injury
causes a mental disability (conversion hysteria following traumatic injury), and mentalmental claims in which mental stress causes mental disability (nervous breakdown
caused by emotional stress). 0 1>
Traditionally, the workers' compensation boards and courts are most likely to
grant awards in the physical-mental and mental-physical cases; all fifty states regard
such claims as compensable.0 2> However, in the new and somewhat uncharted territory
of mental-mental cases, which is the focus of this paper, there are several difficult
issues for determination by the courts. Since there is no physical corroboration for the
disability, it is extremely difficult to prove that a mental disability was caused by work.
The uncertainties inherent in psychiatry make it difficult to determine whether there
was a pre-existing mental illness. Additionally, it is difficult to determine if workrelated stress is an aggravating factor to a pre-existing condition, and if so, whether this
should be compensable under workers' compensation.<tJ> In the resolution of these
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issues the state courts differ in the criteria to be applied as an examination of selected
cases below will demonstrate.
The manner in which state courts have viewed the complex issue of mentalmental claims can be broken into four categories: (1} those denying recovery for
mental-mental claims; (2) those allowing recovery where the mental stress involves
sudden shock; (3) those allowing recovery when the mental stress is unusual; (4) those
allowing recovery where the mental stress is not unusual. <14>
State Courts Denying Recovery for Mental-Mental Claims
The states of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana,
Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, and South Dakota are among the minority, and do not
permit compensation for mental-mental stress cases under any circumstances.0 5l
The following two cases exemplify this minority view. The Supreme Court of
Oklahoma in 1990 addressed the issue of the compensability of a mental-mental claim
in Fenwich v. Oklaboma State Penitentiary.< 16l In this case, a state penitentiary
employee's claim for mental disability resulting from an incident in which he was held
hostage for a few hours was denied . The court concluded that mental injury caused by
work-related stress without physical trauma is not compensable under the Oklahoma
Workers' Compensation Act. <17l
In a fairly recent South Dakota Supreme Court case, Lather v, Huron
the issue of mental-mental compensability was considered for the first time.
Here, the employee left his position as a college basketball coach because of workrelated stress. Subsequently, he was treated for a psychological disorder which
ultimately led to his suicide. The court, in denying the claim, held that mental
disability caused by a mental stimulus was not compensable. <19>
State Courts that Permit Recovery in Mental Injury Caused by Sudden
The second category is composed of states that permit compensation if the
source of the mental stress is caused by a sudden or shocking event. These states are:
Illinois, Maryland, Mississippi, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia.<2°l
An example where the courts applied this somewhat stringent criterion is found
in Transportation Insurance Company v. Maksyn.<2tl where the Supreme Court of
Texas held that gradual mental stress is not compensable, and that recovery for mental
injury was limited to those claimants who had suffered sudden injury. In this particular
case the claimant, an employee of a publishing company, was subjected to an excessive
work load that required constant and excessive overtime, and therefore, because of the
ongoing nature of the injury it was not deemed compensable. <22>

Other courts, however, have not only allowed recovery for mental-mental
claims caused by sudden or shocking stimuli, but also allowed recovery for mental
injuries stemming from gradual and extraordinary stress as well, as shown in the recent
Mississippi Supreme Court case of Borden v. Eskridge. (23) where the court upheld the
disability claim based upon severe depression. Here, the claimant alleged maltreatment
by his supervisor causing him to live in a state of anxiety and depression. The court
held that a worker seeking benefits for psychological injury must show extraordinary
causes, not those usually associated with the workplace. {24)

,.

State Courts that Permit Recovery in Cases of Unusual Mental Stress
The third category of states includes Arizona, Arkansas, Maine, Massachusetts,
New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Colorado, Delaware, Indiana,
Louisiana, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming, all of which allow compensation for
mental-mental claims if the source of the mental stress is considered to be unusual and
in excess of the amount of stress normally associated with everyday employment. (25)
New York is one state that has adopted the majority view, after its highest court
resisted ruling on mental-mental claims for years. In 1975, in the landmark case of
Wolfe v. Sibley. Lindsay & Curr Co.,<26l the New York Court of Appeals for the first
time considered the question of whether psychic trauma is a readily identifiable cause
of psychological or nervous injury. Having earlier decided in Klimas v. Trans
Caribbean Airways (27) that an injury caused by emotional stress or shock may be
accidental within the purview of the compensation law, and having uniformly sustained
awards previously where physical impact resulted in nervous or psychological
disorders,<28> the court in Wolfe, by a four to two decision, and despite a vigorous
dissent, reversed the Appellate Division's denial of the award, and held that the
psychological or nervous injury precipitated by psychic trauma is compensable to the
same extent as physical injury. <29> The claimant, employed as a secretary, worked for a
department store security director who was suffering from a nervous condition. The
supervisor relied heavily on the claimant who not only assumed some of her
supervisor's duties, but became his confidante on the subject of his increasing anxiety
and nervous condition. After calling the police in response to her supervisor's request
and failing to reach him on the intercom, she entered his office and found him lying in
a pool of blood caused by a self-inflicted gunshot wound in the head. She became
extremely upset, lost time from work, and received psychiatric care with
hospitalization. Her condition was diagnosed as acute depressive disorder. (30)
The court, in reinstating the compensation award, noted that, having recognized
the reliability of identifying psychic trauma as a cause of physical injury in some cases
(mental-physical), and psychological injury as a resultant factor in other cases
(physical-mental), it saw no reason for limiting recovery in the latter instance to cases
involving physical impact.(31) Citing Battalia v. State of New York(32) which eliminated
the "impact" doctrine in the field of torts, the court stated: "There is nothing
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talismanic about physical impact. "(33) In passing, the court also noted that its analysis
reflected the majority of decisions in this country. (34)
Apparently, in an effort to restrict the application of its holding and to
distinguish the instant case from its holding in Tobin v. Grossman.(3 5l which refused to
extend to third parties a cause of action in torts for psychic injury incurred without
impact, the court pointed out that the claimant here was not a third party merely
witnessing an injury to another, but was an active panicipant in being involved in her
supervisor's nervous condition. (3 6l In addition, not only did she consider his suicide a
personal failure, but she was an integral part of the tragedy by virtue of his last
communication and her discovery of his lifeless body. <37l
Following Wolfe, the appellate courts in New York have affirmed a number of
awards to claimants where psychological injury was attributable to psychic trauma. In
Gamble v. New York State Narcotics Addict Control Commission.<38l an award for
death benefits was affirmed where the claimant suffered psychic trauma resulting from
a job change. The court held that the claimant's resulting psychosis and mental
derangement caused his suicide and thereby constituted an accidental injury. (3 9)
In another very recent New York case, Friedman v. NBC. Inc.<40> the court held
that a widow of an NBC-TV employee was entitled to compensation due to her
husband's work-related suicide. The court unanimously ruled that although the
deceased suffered from undiagnosed depression for twenty years prior to his suicide,
that his suicide was a result of the depressed condition that was related to stress in his
employment. A reorganization of NBC in 1978 led to deceased's being forced to carry
a beeper, and work extensive overtime during the nights and weekends. In 1980, he
was given a new title and additional responsibilities as manager of the company's
video tape library, an area that had long suffered from operational problems. In his
final letters to his wife and supervisor, he stated that he could no longer face what he
saw as his inevitable failure in this newly assigned capacity. The court held that
workers' compensation death benefits may be awarded if work-related stress causes
insanity or a pattern of mental deterioration. <41 > It further noted that the "casual
relationship" between an industrial accident and a resulting mental condition need not
be direct and immediate rather, "it is sufficient that the work related stress be a
contributing cause of the psychic injury. "<42>
In some cases the New York appellate courts have denied awards to claimants in
mental injury claims. In Everett v. A.S. Steel Rule Die Comoration.<43l the court held
the claimant did not sustain an industrial accident within the meaning of the Workers'
Compensation Act where he became incapacitated due to a mental condition causally
related to his observation of a bloody bandage on the hand of a coworker. Relying on
the holding in Wolfe, where the claimant was an active participant, the court stated that
it does not extend compensability to mental-mental injury sustained by a claimant who
merely observes an injured coworker.<44l

An example of how the appellate courts in New York have differed in the
application of Wolfe is seen in Wood v. Laidlaw Transit. Inc .. <45) where the claimant, a
school bus driver, came upon the scene of a gruesome automobile accident in which
two young children, known to her, died. She thereafter developed symptoms of a
psychological nature requiring hospitalization and treatment for a condition diagnosed
as a post-traumatic stress disorder. Relying on the "active participant" criterion in
Wolfe, the Appellate Division reversed the decision of the Workers' Compensation
Board awarding benefits. On further appeal, the Court of Appeals, also relying on
Wolfe, reversed the Appellate Division and affirmed the decision of the Board on the
"an active participant in the tragedy. "<46>
grounds that the claimant
Subsequent to Wolfe, other states in responding to the increase in workplace
stress have placed themselves in the mainstream of workers' compensation
jurisprudence by accepting mental-mental claims. Stokes v. First National Bank,<47) a
South Carolina case is just such an example. Here, a bank employee suffered a
nervous breakdown as a result of a greatly increased work load and job responsibility, a
by-product of a corporate merger.<48l The South Carolina Court of Appeals, in
accepting mental-mental claims for the first time, held that the claimants prolonged
increase in work hours, combined with additional job duties constituted "unusual and
extraordinary conditions of employment" which resulted in a compensable accidental
injury. <49>
In Candelaria v. General Electric Co., <50) a New Mexico case, the claimant
suffered anxiety attacks with several hospitalizations resulting from personality conflicts
with his supervisor. The court held that psychological injury resulting from a sudden
or gradual emotional stimulus "arises out of' employment when it is causally related to
job performance. (51)
Until Sparks v. Tulane Medical Center Hospital & Clinic.<52) the Supreme Court
of Louisiana had never considered the issue of the compensability of a mental-mental
claim. Here, the employee claimed that she had been continually harassed and
threatened by co-employees causing her to suffer a disabling mental condition. <53) The
court noted that mental health is an intrinsic component of the physical structure of the
body and that the circumstances here satisfied the requirement of an accidental
injury. <54>
State Courts that Permit Recovery if the Source of the Mental Stress is Not
Unusual
The final category of states, which have accepted mental-mental compensation
claims, includes Alaska, California, Hawaii, 1\entucky, Michigan, New Jersey,
Oregon, Pennsylvania and West Virginia, all of which have allowed such claims even
if the cause of the mental stress is not deemed to be unusual or excessive. (55)
Carter v. General Motors,<56l was one of the earliest cases to recognize the
compensability of claims where mental injury results in the absence of physical impact
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or physical stimulus. Here, the claimant developed a paranoid schizophrenia condition
and required hospitalization after being unable to keep up with the pace of work
demanded by his supervisor, although such work was shown not to be unusual. The
Supreme Court of Michigan held that "emotional disabilities are compensable under the
Workers' Compensation Act regardless of whether the cause was a direct physical
injury or mental shock. "<57l
Following Carter, the Michigan courts affirmed awards in mental-mental cases,
including those based upon workers' subjective perceptions of stress. <58> However,
following a 1980 amendment to the Michigan Compensation Law, <59> in 1991 the Court
of Appeals in Iloyan v. General Motors Corp.<60> clearly rejected the subjective
standard test applied in earlier cases. Here, the plaintiff alleged having "major
depression" with the onset emotional disorder occurring in relationship to the stress he
allegedly experienced in his workplace, where he described himself as "feeling
mistreated, pressured and demeaned."<61 > In reversing an award by the Workers'
Compensation Board, the court held that the Board mistakenly applied the invalidated
Deziel subjective standard and that the correct legal standard to be applied was that of
an actual, precipitating, work-related trauma, event, or events and not just an
unfounded perception thereof. (62)
Human Rights Cases and Job-Related Stress

While the greater number of job-related stress claims are made under workers'
compensation, in some instances, employees have been able to successfully pursue such
claims outside of the workers' compensation area. In New York City Transit Authority
v. State Division of Human Rights (Adrienne Nash)<63 > the New York State Court of
Appeals reversed an appellate court ordered reduction of a $450,0000 award for mental
anguish in a sex discrimination case, and remitted the matter to the Appellate Division
for reconsideration. The high court noted that, "Mental suffering is not only
compensable, but also a frequent
sometimes sole, consequence of unlawful
discriminatory condition. "(64)
Another recent case from New York's highest court, exemplifying its
willingness to compensate employees for mental anguish and humiliation in
discrimination cases, is Consolidated Edison Company of New York. Inc. v. New
York State Division of Human Rights (Pamela Easton).<65> The court held that there
was substantial evidence supporting the finding of the State Commissioner of Human
Rights, that Consolidated Edison discriminated against Pamela Easton, a black woman,
on the basis of sex and race, by promoting two white males to supervisory positions,
both of whom lacked her experience level. In upholding the Commissioner's award of
$10,000 for hurt, humiliation, and mental anguish suffered, the court noted "the effects
of discrimination were perceived everyday when the complainant reported to white
males, petitioners had promoted over her. "<66>

Tort Cases and Job-Related Stress

Workers' compensation acts typically provide the sole or exclusive means for
workers to receive compensation benefits, with recovery unaffected by any
negligence on the part of the employer. Yet because workers' compensation limits the
recovery, attorneys frequently search for alternatives to employer's exclusivity of
remedy protection. In recent years we have seen instances in which appellate courts
exclusive remedy provisions of workers' compensation
have carved exceptions to
law, particularly with respect to non-physical employee tortious acts, such as
intentional infliction of emotional distress, sexual harassment, and discrimination.
In some work-related mental stress claims pursued under state discrimination
statutes, employers have raised the issue of the "exclusive remedy" provisions of the
state workers' compensation laws. This issue was squarely faced in Boscaglia v.
Michigan Bell Telephone Co., <67l where the claimant brought an action for damages
alleging violation of her civil rights and sought recovery for physical and mental or
emotional injury. Here, the court held that the exclusive remedy provision of the
Workers' Compensation Act did not bar such an action where the employee was
alleging a violation of the Fair Employment Practice Act or the Michigan Civil Rights
Act.<68>
' • .o;

... -.;. ...

In Rojo v. Kliger,<69 >where an employee brought an action against her employer
and co-employees for sexual harassment under the Fair Employment and Housing Acts
and intentional infliction of emotional distress, the California Supreme Court held that
an employee need not seek remedy through the Fair Employment and Housing Acts
before filing suit on common law grounds of sexual discrimination. This decision lends
support to the argument that civil and workers' compensation remedies should be
cumulative rather than mutually exclusive. The California Labor Code allows tort
damages to be awarded against coworkers guilty of sexual harassment, without a
reduction of workers' compensation benefit awards. (70)
In Levinson v. Prentice Hall. Inc.<71), the United States District Court permitted
a handicapped employee to first prove that the employer violated state fair employment
practice and then to receive back pay, compensation damages and reinstatement. The
court then permitted the employee to apply common law principles to seek punitive
damages. This case demonstrated how common law employment rights can be used to
obtain large punitive awards on top of those awards already granted by state and federal
civil rights law. Levinson claimed he had been denied several promotions and had
been repeatedly subjected to ridicule and mimicked for his uneven walk. Levinson
claimed that the ridicule emotionally hurt, resulting in his crying in bed to his wife,
apologizing for not getting the promotion and for being less of a man for not receiving
a promotion. Levinson, who suf\ered from multiple sclerosis, sued for punitive and

17

16
compensatory damages for emotional distress. The court awarded him $100,000 for
mental suffering due to discrimination and 2.3 million dollars in punitive damages<72l.
In Pikop v. Burlington Northern Railroad Company, <73> a railroad employee
filed suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress alleging that she was constantly
insulted by her supervisor, forced to observe as her coworkers tortured and killed rats
and birds, and the company refused to listen to her complaints. <74> The Supreme Court
of Minnesota held that claims of employees against the railroad for intentional infliction
of emotional distress did not necessitate the showing of physical injury under state tort
law and, thereby, were not preempted by either the Railway Labor Act or the Federal
Employers Liability Act, which limit recovery to intentional torts that cause physical
injury. <75>
legislative Responses to Stress-Related Claims

State legislative bodies have responded to the flood of stress-related claims and
to the liberal and expansive judicial interpretation of compensation statutes, which has
broadened the application of the concepts of "accident" and "injury" to include mentalmental claims. Some legislative amendments to workers' compensation statutes
narrowly redefine "accident" and "injury" to expressly prohibit mental stress claims.
Other amendments establish new criteria in the determination of mental injury claims,
and some create more demanding standards of proof.
It appears that Montana has taken an extreme position in excluding all mental
stress claims when it amended its definition of "injury" under its compensation act by
excluding physical and mental conditions arising from emotional or mental stress or
non-physical stimulus or activity. <76> Thus, workers who suffer heart attacks from jobrelated stress are no longer covered (mental-physical claims), nor are workers who
suffer a disabling nervous breakdown or any psychological disorder resulting from
emotional or mental stress (mental-mental claims).<77l

On the other hand, Massachusetts and New York have taken a more modest
position in excluding job-related mental stress claims that arise out of bona fide
personnel actions. The Massachusetts legislature amended its compensation laws, and
in effect overruled the decision in Kelly's Case,<78> by adding the following: "No
mental or emotional disability arising principally out of a bona fide, personnel action
including a transfer, promotion, demotion, or termination except such action which is
the intentional infliction of emotional harm shall be deemed to be a personal injury
within the meaning of this chapter. "(79) Strikingly similar language is found in the New
York amendment which states that the "terms 'injury' and 'personal injury' shall not
include an injury that is solely mental and is based on work-related stress, if such
mental injury is a direct consequence of a lawful personnel decision, involving a
disciplinary action, work evaluation, job transfer, demotion, or termination taken in
good faith by the employer. "<SO) It appears that this amendment in effect reverses the
holding in Gamble. <8 1l

The recent legislative enactments regarding mental-mental claims in other states
vary in the degree of complexity. The amendments in Louisiana, Oregon, Michigan,
Colorado, California and New Mexico are good examples.
Apparently, in a direct response to Sparks,<82> Louisiana's Workers'
Compensation Act was amended to provide a new definition of "injury" as follows:
"Mental injury or illness resulting from work-related stress shall not be considered a
personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment and is not
compensable . . . unless the
tal injury was the result of a sudden, unexpected, and
extraordinary stress related to employment and is demonstrated by clear and convincing
evidence. "(83) Furthermore, a new subsection for mental injury or illness requires a
diagnosis by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist and the diagnosis must meet the
criteria of the American Psychiatric Association.<84> This would appear to rule out an
employee's subjective allegation as to the appearance of symptoms of mental injury
such as anxiety, and that the mental injury must be precipitated by an "accident". In
addition, the requirement of "clear and convincing evidence" creates a new element of
proof, more demanding than previously required. <85 > Oregon, similar to Louisiana in
complexity, and in establishing new criteria for mental injury claims, amended its
statute providing for a strict set of standards for the compensability of such claims.
First, the claimant must now establish that the work conditions creating the mental
disorder exist in an objective sense; second, the employment conditions establishing the
mental disorder are not conditions inherent in everyday work situations, such as
disciplinary actions, job performance evaluations, and termination of employment;
third, the diagnosis of the emotional disorder must be acceptable in the medical
community; finally, the claimant must present clear and convincing evidence that the
mental disorder arose out of and in the course of employment. <86>
Michigan's legislature limited mental injury claims by amending its
compensation statute to read that "mental disabilities and conditions of the aging
process, including but not limited to heart and cardiovascular conditions shall be
compensable if contributed to or aggravated or accelerated by the employment in a
significant manner. Mental disabilities shall be compensable when arising out of actual
events of employment, not unfounded perceptions thereof w<81l (italics supplied) In
requiring that the mental disability be related to employment in a significant manner
Moreover, this amendment
creates a stricter standard than that found in
clearly invalidates the subjective "honest perception" test found in Dezie1,<89>
Colorado's amendment now defines "accident", "injury", and "occupational
disease" as not including "disability or death caused _by or resulting from mental or
emotional stress unless it is shown by competent evidence that such mental or
emotional stress is proximately caused solely by hazards to which the worker would not
have been equally exposed outside the employment. "<90>
California by amendment has estabVshed a new and higher threshold of
compensability for psychiatric injury by
a diagnosis of mental injury or
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disorder meeting the criteria of the American Psychiatry Association or criteria
generally approved and accepted nationally by practitioners in the field of psychiatric
medicine.<91) Additionally, the employee must demonstrate by a preponderance of
evidence that actual events of employment were responsible for at least 10% of the total
causation from all sources contributing to the psychiatric injury. <92>

Lifetrack materials cover a wide range of topics and provide explanations of the
mechanism of stress in the workplace; the materials are family-oriented and promote a
Within the past three years, employees participating
balanced life style for
in Lifetrack health assessments have shown a 7% improvement in how they cope with
stress. <105>

Governor Pete Wilson proposed an amendment that would require workers to
prove that their mental disability came from their employment, not their families or
personal lives. (93) Although, the legislature did not agree to this reform, they did enact
a requirement that workers must be employed six months prior to their claim. <94>

In companies throughout the United States increasing numbers of professionals
and managers are rejecting grueling work loads, much of which leads to stress despite
the frequent high salaries that accompany these positions. Employees are reconsidering
their priorities and are seemingly willing to accept salary reductions in exchange for
time they need for their personal lives. John P. Robinson, Director of Americans Use
of Time Project for the University of Maryland, claims that leisure time not money,
will be the status symbol of the 1990's.0 06 > In a study Robinson conducted for the
Hilton Hotel Corporation, 50% of all workers surveyed were willing to forego one
day's pay per week for the additional day of rest time. 0°1l Over three quarters of the
respondents place "more time to spend with friends and family" as their top priority,
whereas only 61% chose "making more money" as their primary goal.0°8> Similar
concerns for a balanced lifestyle in reducing stress have been addressed by Texas
Instruments, Inc. which has established part-time work-pilot programs. 0 09>

Finally, the New Mexico legislature, in response to Candelaria<95 > amended its
compensation act by redefining primary mental impairment "to mean a mental illness
arising from an accidental injury involving not physical injury and consists of a
psychologically traumatic event that is generally outside of a worker's usual experience
. . . but is not an event in connection with disciplinary, corrective or job evaluation
action or cessation of the worker's employment. "<96>
Business Responses to Stress-Related Claims

A variety of actions have been undertaken by employers to prevent the sources
of stress that are precipitating mental stress claims, such as making use of diagnostic
stress systems, providing individual counseling, and creating stress-reduction and
control programs. (97) Employees from companies that offer stress reduction programs
are 50% less likely to miss work or quit their jobs due to stress, according to the
Northwestern Life Insurance survey. <98> Researchers calculated the average cost of
rehabilitating stress disabled employees at $1925 and, if not rehabilitated, the cost
would be an average of $73,270.<99 > The survey also showed that the employers who
offered stress-reduction programs have more healthful employees, with higher rates of
productivity, lower turnover and less absenteeism.< 100> Due to the increase of mentalmental claims, and the frequently ensuing likelihood of litigation, it has become
essential for employers to learn to protect themselves.
The optimal strategy appears to be one of teaching employees to effectively
handle the pressure of their jobs, and thus reduce the occurrence of work-related stress
tnJunes.
For example, Texas Instruments Inc. has initiated a holistic stress
management philosophy that encompasses a wide range of programs. <101 > The National
Employee Services and Records Association, a non-profit organization with over 15
million members nation-wide, cited Texas Instruments Inc. as the Employer of the
Year in 1991, based largely on their employee services and recognition programs along
with their organizational structure that places a high value on people. 0 02> Texas
Instruments sees stress as a useful and positive force in the workplace and attempts to
educate employees through their wellness program, Lifetrack.< 103> This program is
available at three major United States facilities, and includes health assessments and
recommendations for participation in company-sponsored wellness programs. <104> The

Developing Trends in Job-Related Stress

The number of stress
in the 1990's is expected to increase as a result of a
changing work environment, namely, work-place technology becoming more
sophisticated (the use of VDT terminals, computers, and electronic monitoring), the
increased presence of workers with AIDS and HIV positive, the employment of
disabled persons, and the perceptions of workers being sexually harassed and
discriminated.
In ILC Data Device v. County of Suffolk0 10> a New York appellate court
recently heard arguments in an attempt to resurrect a 1988 law regarding the use of
video display terminals in companies with over 20 terminal users. The law was voided
in late 1989 by the New York State Supreme Court, which ruled the county was barred
by the State Home Rule law from enaCting laws affecting employee/employer
relations.0 1n The 1988 law required employers with more than 20 video display
terminal users to provide equipment meeting standards for stress reduction, specified
lighting and noise reduction devices, as well as 15-minute breaks for every three hours
of employee work time. 012) A similar law was struck down in California as being
overridden by the State's Occupational Safety and Health law; the issues being raised
challenge whether these statutes directed at workplace stress conflict with the federal
OSHA Act of 1970.<113)
At the 1991 annual meeting of the
Factors Society commentators
that required increased research.
indicated that the effect of technostress
Thomas Sheridan, a professor of Man-Machines Laboratory at MIT, asserted that
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computers and automation have alienated workers, and the use of computer networks
has led to a blurring of the lines of work responsibility and accountability. 0 14>
Lawrence Schleiter, a research psychologist with the Stress Reduction Laboratory at the
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, is concerned by the findings of
his investigation regarding electronic performance monitoring. <115> Although Schleiter
believes technology can contribute to positive changes in the workplace, he fears that it
also brings with it an interference into the dynamics of interaction in the workplace. <116>
Researchers have found that employees who are electronically monitored by
their supervisors report higher levels of stress and repetitive strain illnesses. Dr.
Michael Smith, head of Industrial Energy Department of the University of Wisconsin,
in his study of seven regional telephone companies, Ol7) found that monitored workers
reported greater work load dissatisfaction, and a perception of less control over their
jobs and greater levels of anxiety and tension. Smith's study concluded that electronic
monitoring had a negative effect on employee perceptions of their work. 0 18>
Another area of growing concern for potential increase of stress claims is the
increase of AIDS in the workplace.< 119> William Donnelly, Public Education
Coordinator for the AIDS Foundation, citing statistics on the impact of AIDS in the
workplace, projected that at least one million HIV positive employees are currently in
the workplace and forecasts a dramatic increase in stress-related claims from
employees working closely with HIV positive coworkers.< 12°> The stresses related to
those working in high risk professions ·(public health, medical , public safety) have
shown the need to minimize the risk and stress through educational programs. Workrelated stress can also become a contributing factor in accelerating the HIV virus for an
HIV positive employee. It is believed that stress hastens the disease's progress and
companies might eventually have to deal with claims based on this factor.0 21 >. For
example, in a recent New York decision, Castro v. New Life Insurance Company,0 22>
the court upheld a claim for negligent infliction of distress in an AIDS phobia case.
Here, the claimant, a cleaning woman, developed AIDS phobia after being struck by a
negligently disposed hypodermic needle.
The employment of disabled persons poses another area of concern for
employers.
California workers' compensation attorney, Richard H. Jordan,
recommended that congress should amend the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
or the EEO Commission should issue new regulations to avoid the difficulties
employers are now facing from employees claiming emotional stress caused by
personnel actions. 0 23 > In many states, employees currently have the right to seek
workers' compensation benefits and ADA remedies when they are suffering from
emotional disorders and are denied employment opportunities by the employer they
worked for at the time of their injury.<124> Jordan recommends eliminating job stress
claims based on personnel actions from workers' compensation, establishing a new
grievance system, and prohibiting employees from using decisions from workers'
compensation tribunals to support claims of mental impairments under the ADA; he
believes these changes would free employers from a fear of unlimited and unrestricted

liability for mental injuries and would further the intention of the workers'
compensation law and the ADA. (125)
Another developing trend relating to job stress is found in the area of sex
and
harassment, where victims report difficulty in sleeping,
hstlessness, depressiOn, deep feelings of worthlessness and self-blame. (126) Some
the
sexual harassment claims are costing American companies a
staggenng $11 bilhon annually.<127) Under a 1986 Supreme Court decision sexual
was
to be a form of discrimination, for which the employer is
held hable.0 28> Studies show 90% of the women in the work force see sexual
harassment as a major problem. 0 29> Companies with stringent sexual harassment
productivity and morale. (130> According to a survey conducted
by
magazme 74% of all companies have sexual harassment policies.031J The
key to a successful sexual harassment prohibition policy appears to be a combination of
commitment by management, education and intervention. Companies who choose not
to deal effectively with this problem, may one day find themselves paying vast sums in
discrimination suits.
Conclusion

Stress induced psychological disorders are becoming the fastest developing
segment of occupational ills, with the number of mental-mental claims continuing to
grow each year.
This growth can be attributed to a number of economic
psychological, and sociological reasons, including technological advances in societ;
and overall work environment situations. In addition, the courts liberal interpretation
of workers' compensation laws, human rights law and common law torts, to embrace
work-related stress claims, have contributed to the growth of such claims. There can
be little doubt that mental claims caused by workplace stress will continue to increase
with more. litigation in the workers' compensation and state court systems, with the
resultant high cost to employers, employees and society at large.
While employers have in some measure met with success in lobbying state
legislatures for changes in workers' compensation laws in order to reduce mentalmental claims, it is questionable whether this will be an effective solution to the
crisis in society engendered by stress related disability claims. While the
legislatures, and to a lesser degree, the courts, are faced with the difficult and delicate
task of balancing the interest of employers, workers, and society at large, the pervasive
nature of work-place stress and its resultant disability cannot be ignored. As one court
noted,
anxiety, strain and mental stress from work are frequently more
devastatmg than a mere physical injury . .. ". (132)
Perhaps a better solution would be for employers to adopt a holistic strt
philosophy
would focus more on the value of workers as perso s
and
mto account
human needs.<133> Employers might develop progra s
promotmg a balanced hfe style and allowing time for their employees' personal and
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family lives. Other stress reduction and stress control programs could be instituted by
employers. These might include educating employees to effectively handle stress,
providing individual and group counseling, and adopting new policies designed to
foster better work environments and better relationships between employers and
employees. These initiatives will go a long way toward the resolution of this emerging
crisis.
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COMPARATIVE ASPECTS OF ANTITRUST LAW
BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES
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Antitrust law in the Unites States and in Japan are
fundamentally similar. There are, however, significant
and minor differences. Both aspects will be explored in
this paper. We will first summarily examine the nature
of antitrust law in the United States and then compare
its common and dissimilar characteristics with that of
Japan.
There are three basic statutes which together Wi·th
their amendments define antitrust prohibitions and
sanctions in the United States. They are: the Sherman
Antitrust Act of 1890, the Clayton Act of 1914 and the
Federal Trade Commission Act to 1914.
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 1
The act as amended states:
Section
1
"Every
contract,
combination in the form of trust or
otherwise,
or
conspiracy,
in
restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign
nations, is hereby declared to be
illegal. Every person who shall make
any such contract or engage in any
such combination or conspiracy shall
be guilty of a felony ...
Section 2
"Every person who shall
monopolize,
or
attempt
to
monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony ... "
Jurisdiction
The
constitutional
basis
for
Congressional intervention in antitrust activities is
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